

# **How to Sell Weapons ? – How to Analyse Marketing Strategies? International Fairs and Communication Policy of Arms Producers in the 19th and 20th Century**

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Business historians and economists have shown in recent publications that the creation of a corporate image has become ever more important for firms in the course of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>1</sup> What does this mean for weapon and arms producing enterprises, which are highly bound to a specific market structure? In examining this question, I shall first look at the general structure of the different markets for weapons and military goods. In which way does the structure of the national and latter international arms trade influence the distribution and marketing strategies of European weapon producers like Krupp, Rheinmetall or others? This chapter (pp. 1-6) serve as a general introduction in the field of arms markets. The more specific questions of my EBHA-paper are presented in the following chapters. In the second part of my paper, I shall look at the different marketing strategies of these firms, which use national fairs and international expositions as well as special forms of event marketing. These special case studies in the field of marketing lead me to the creation of national, transnational or global images of the corporations. I shall look at the brands and logos which are designed and used in specific manners and which are transformed into symbols with national or international character. In which way do the different aspects of marketing create a Corporate Design or at least a Corporate Identity for the mentioned firms? Thus, I shall finally share with you my thoughts about the way arms corporations create an image, of themselves, of their unique brands and of their advantageous technological knowledge. Finally I want to discuss with you these preliminary results of a far-reaching research project focussed on the History of the European Arms Producers in the Cold War. The paper is a first conception of this work in progress, for which first archive studies are already planned. Therefore I am grateful for critics and further advices, especially concerning methodological regards.

## **1. An Overview of the Market structures**

The structure of this market is difficult to describe, because it depends on one's definition of the whole sector. There are no german statistics which collect data about a weapon or an arms

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<sup>1</sup> John T. Balmer/Stephen A. Greyser (Ed.): *Revealing the Corporation. Perspectives on identity, image, reputation, corporate branding, and corporate-level marketing*, London/New York 2003; Roland Marchand: *Corporate Soul. The Rise of Public Relations and Corporate Imagery in American Big Business*, Berkeley 1998; Heribert Meffert (Ed.): *Strategische Markenführung und Marketing – Beiträge zur marktorientierten Unternehmenspolitik*, Wiesbaden 1988; Klaus-Peter Wiedmann/Hans Raffée: *Corporate Identity als strategische Basis der Marketing-Kommunikation*, in: Ralph Berndt/Arnold Hermanns (Ed.): *Handbuch Marketing-Kommunikation. Strategien – Instrumente – Perspektiven*, Wiesbaden 1993, pp. 43-67.; Georg Schreyögg: *Unternehmenskultur: Zur Unternehmenskulturdiskussion in der Betriebswirtschaftslehre und einigen Querverbindungen zur Unternehmensgeschichtsschreibung*, in: *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte (JWG)* 1993/2, pp. 21ff.; Susanne Hilger: *„Amerikanisierung“ deutscher Unternehmen. Wettbewerbsstrategien und Unternehmenspolitik bei Henkel, Siemens und Daimler Benz 1945–1975*, Stuttgart 2004; Klaus Peter Landgrebe: *Imagewerbung und Firmenstil*, Hamburg 1980; Richard Tedlow: *Keeping the Corporate Image: Public Relations and Business, 1900-1950*, Greenwich/Connecticut 1979.

industry. In contrast to other European states like Great Britain, Italy and France, but also to the USA, there is also no special association or lobby group. Instead there are many different lobbying associations such as “*Wehrtechnischer Ausschuss des Bundesverband Deutscher Industrie*”, “*Bundesverband der Deutschen Luft- und Raumfahrtindustrie*” or the “*Verband Deutscher Schiffbauer*”.<sup>2</sup> The first fundamental study of the sector in Germany from Kaiserreich to BRD with a political overview is from Norbert Zdrowomyslaw and Heinz-J. Bontrup.<sup>3</sup> According to Bontrup, it is possible, on the one hand in a broader perspective on the “defence sector” to speak about the military relevance and influences of military suppliers for the whole economy. Industrial linkages exist from the fast food shops near the headquarters and barracks up to high-technology instruments of the IT- an ET-sector.<sup>4</sup> Many products have a dual-use-character – civil or military – like airplanes or electronic systems, which makes a clear specification difficult. On the other hand, a more narrow definition of “arms industry” would only contain phenomena of a pure weapon-production i.e. tanks, guns, ammunition, bomber.

I will concentrate on this focus in my paper, because this narrow definition also includes a great variety of industries, such as aerospace and shipbuilding industries, weapon producers, producers of military vehicles, of ammunition and explosives. Certainly, these kinds of arms producing enterprises belong to the producer goods industry rather than to the consumer goods industry. Hartwig Hummel has shown us, that in the FRG there are typically two kinds of arms producing enterprises: the family or state financed special firm or the huge conglomerate under control of big concerns.<sup>5</sup> Often business historians have underestimated the role of weapon production in large-scale enterprises of this sector, which have recently been researched, such as Krupp.<sup>6</sup> In certain years even in the German *Kaiserreich* Krupp – like others later<sup>7</sup> – has reached a high percentage of military production, but altogether the degree of military dependency changes over time.

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<sup>2</sup> Hartwig Hummel: *Rüstungsexportbeschränkungen in Japan und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Hamburg/Münster 1991, pp. 294f.; Michael Brzoska: *Rüstungsexportpolitik. Lenkung, Kontrolle und Einschränkung bundesdeutscher Rüstungsexporte in die Dritte Welt*, Frankfurt a.M. 1986, p. 167; Michael Brzoska/Anton Andreas Guha/Christian Wellmann: *Das Geschäft mit dem Tod. Fakten & Hintergründe der Rüstungsindustrie*, Frankfurt a.M. 1982, pp. 16-18.

<sup>3</sup> Norbert Zdrowomyslaw/Heinz-J. Bontrup: *Die deutsche Rüstungsindustrie. Vom Kaiserreich bis zur Bundesrepublik. Ein Handbuch*, Heilbronn 1988.


<sup>4</sup> Zdrowomyslaw/Bontrup: *Die deutsche Rüstungsindustrie*, pp. 46 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Hummel, *Rüstungsexportbeschränkungen*, p. 292.

<sup>6</sup> Werner Abelshäuser: *Rüstungsschmiede der Nation? Der Kruppkonzern im Dritten Reich und in der Nachkriegszeit 1933-1951*, in: Lothar Gall (Ed.): *Krupp im 20. Jahrhundert. Die Geschichte des Unternehmens vom Ersten Weltkrieg bis zur Gründung der Stiftung*, Berlin 2002, pp. 267-472, esp. pp. 446-472; Lothar Gall, *Von der Entlassung Alfred Krupp von Bohlen und Halbachs bis zur Errichtung seiner Stiftung 1951 bis 1967/68*, in: Gall (Ed.): *Krupp im 20. Jahrhundert*, pp. 473-589.

<sup>7</sup> For a detailed analysis of the German arms industry and their military production share see Hummel: *Rüstungsexportbeschränkungen*, pp. 289-305.

## Produktion bei Krupp, 1872/73-1913/14



Sources: Feldenkirchen, Eisen- und Stahlindustrie, Anhang and WA Krupp Bestand IV.

This problem presents a great difficulty for historians regarding enterprises which have no clearly defined military character of production. Difficulties often arise due to unclear boundaries between civil and military production. For the majority of modern weapon systems it is a fact that they are dependent on a great variety of main contractors and other suppliers, which, to a large extent, produce civilian goods. Hence the historical sources and materials in the business archives are also problematic, because descriptions of the later use are often lacking. A good example are the producers of tank steel, which haven't marked in their statistics whether their steel is used for civilian or military purposes.<sup>8</sup>

Economists often consider only highly abstracted and aggregated empirical data, concentrating on readily available statistics of governmental military or defence expenditures. These expenditures in relation to other indicators like per capita-income, gross national product or education expenditures should mark the dimension and the importance of the military sector for the whole economy and society.<sup>9</sup> In Germany these studies range from sociological, financial sociological studies to international political theory research.<sup>10</sup> For the German historical research the dictum of Michael Geyer from 1984 is still valid:

<sup>8</sup> Roland Peter used in his regional study of the World War II war economy in Baden a wide definition of "Rüstungsbetriebe", which include all kind of enterprises which are defined by nazi government and military offices as "Rüstungsbetriebe". Because of the totalitarian character of World War II there is a huge number of arms enterprises according to this definition. See Roland Peter: Rüstungspolitik in Baden. Kriegswirtschaft und Arbeitseinsatz in einer Grenzregion im Zweiten Weltkrieg, München 1995, esp. p. 6.

<sup>9</sup> See my debate on the development of this concept in: Der "Military-Industrial Complex" in den USA, in: JWG 1999, pp. 103-134. Also Walter Wittmann, Rüstungswirtschaft II: Militärausgaben, in: Handwörterbuch der Wirtschaftswissenschaften (HdWW), Bd. 6, Stuttgart 1981, pp. 513-522.

<sup>10</sup> Lutz Köllner: Militär und Finanzen. Zur Finanzgeschichte und Finanzsoziologie von Militärausgaben in Deutschland, München 1982; Norbert Zdrovomyslaw: Wirtschaft, Krise und Rüstung. Die Militärausgaben in ihrer wirtschaftlichen und wirtschaftspolitischen Bedeutung in Deutschland von der Reichsgründung bis zur Gegenwart, Bremen 1985; Walter Wittmann: Militärausgaben und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, in: Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 122 (1966), pp. 109-129.

"Insbesondere die Geschichte der Rüstungsindustrie, ganz zu schweigen von der Geschichte der Forschung und Entwicklung, aber auch der personellen Rüstung ist noch nicht geschrieben."<sup>11</sup> It is still true, despite the recent research on the arms production of Early Modern Times, the Third Reich and the aerospace industries.<sup>12</sup> It lacks especially on historical market analyses, enterprise studies, historical research on the international distribution and the arms trade development, as well as with the base of firms. Theoretical and methodological aspects are far more concerned in anglo-american studies of technological spin-offs, rentability of military procurement and of the structure of arms trade.<sup>13</sup> In addition to economic studies the far reaching, intense research performance of the *Military-Industrial-Complex-Concept* should be mentioned, which dealt with the connections between politicians, lobbyists, managers, scientists and high-rank military.<sup>14</sup> Topics which still haven't been the focus of German historical research on war and military.<sup>15</sup>

But it seems to be clear, from an economic point of view that arms and weapons are very special goods. There's no direct consumption or need for weapons in peoples everyday life. Arms are mostly used in military interventions or conflicts of greater dimension, in the case of the western nations they've only had to be scrapped after long periods of peace without use of weapons.

From an economic point of view the arms market is also a very special one. It's structure is rather monopsonistic, because of the state often being the most important contractor. Sometimes it's even oligo-, dyo- or tripolistic, because of smaller enterprises and big business like Krupp in the German Kaiserreich trying to increase their sales by selling their weapons to other nations and governments. Prices are not only fixed due to the market forces, but depend also on governmental regulation of the arms market.<sup>16</sup> This regulation also plays a role for the producing branches and bases, because strategic security is a main factor in the enterprises choice of location, which has recently become an important theme for urban historians.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Geyer: Deutsche Rüstungspolitik, pp. 242 and pp. 243 ff.; Bernd Wegner: *Kliometrie des Krieges? Ein Plädoyer für eine quantifizierende Militärgeschichtsforschung in vergleichender Absicht*, in: MGFA, *Militärgeschichte*, pp. 60-78.

<sup>12</sup> Stefanie van de Kerkhof: *Rüstungsindustrie und Kriegswirtschaft*, in: Thomas Kühne/Benjamin Ziemann (Ed.): *Was ist Militärgeschichte?*, Paderborn 2000, pp. 175-194.

<sup>13</sup> Besides Krause: *Arms also William Baldwin: The Structure of the Defense Market, 1955-1964*, Durham 1967; Jacques Gansler: *The Defense Industry*, Cambridge 1980; Nicole Ball/Milton Leitenberg (Ed.): *The Structure of the Defense Industry. An International Survey*, London 1983; Gavin Kennedy: *Defense Economics*, London 1983 and Hans H. Glissmann/Ernst-Jürgen Horn: *Rüstung und Wohlfahrt - Theoretische und strukturelle Besonderheiten des Rüstungsmarktes*, in: Kieler Arbeitspapier Nr. 517, Institut für Weltwirtschaft 1992.

<sup>14</sup> See van de Kerkhof, "Military-Industrial Complex" and good overviews in: Benjamin F. Cooling (Ed.): *War, Business, and American Society. Historical Perspectives on the Military-Industrial Complex*, Port Washington/London 1977; Paul A. C. Koistinen: *The Military-Industrial Complex. A Historical Perspective*, New York 1980; Keith Hartley/Nick Hooper: *The Economics of Defence, Disarmament and Peace. An Annotated Bibliography*, Aldershot 1990.


<sup>15</sup> Exceptions are: Volker R. Berghahn: *Der militärisch-industrielle Komplex des Kaiserreichs*, in: *Rüstung und Machtpolitik. Zur Anatomie des "Kalten Krieges" vor 1914*, Düsseldorf 1973, pp. 47-69; Ernst Willi Hansen: *Zum "Militärisch-Industriellen-Komplex" in der Weimarer Republik*, in: Klaus-Jürgen Müller/Eckardt Opitz (Ed.): *Militär und Militarismus in der Weimarer Republik*, Düsseldorf 1978, pp. 101-140.

<sup>16</sup> Baldwin: *Structure*.

<sup>17</sup> Bernhard Kirchgässner/Günter Scholz (Ed.): *Stadt und Krieg*, Sigmaringen 1989; Bernhard Sicken (Ed.): *Stadt und Militär 1815-1914. Wirtschaftliche Impulse, infrastrukturelle Beziehungen, sicherheitspolitische Aspekte*, Paderborn 1998 and Andrea Theissen/Arnold Wirtgen e. a. (Ed.): *Militärstadt Spandau. Zentrum der preußischen Waffenproduktion 1722 bis 1918*, Berlin 1998.

Considering the results of new institutional economics there is much of importance in researching the arms industry. With regard to an institutional approach, the arms industry is also a special sector. The property rights are much more tied to the nation-building processes and developments than in other sectors. In Germany arms manufacturing was as much induced by the state as was the industrial production. In the case of war-economies or war-like economies (B. Carroll) a governmental regulation regarding the installation of public enterprises instead of private firms has been observed.<sup>18</sup> These changes in the market structure have even been seen in the case of greater parts of the American economy in the Cold War. Because of the permanent conflicts with the Sowjetunion at the aftermath of World War II a restructuring of the arms industry has taken place. The Cold War rivalry between the two super powers and their allies caused an arms race with special implications for the concerned enterprises. In the USA a system of competition for the arms industry was refused in favour of a widely regulated market structure. A competition for governmental arms contracts became more and more unnecessary due to the technological development. Rivalries were limited to the main contractors, which try harshly to obtain contracts for huge research- and development-programs. These contracts were of a special type, which guaranteed further expansion (*cost-plus-contracts*). Because of the high speed of changing innovation-cycles there has to be a guarantee for the contractors investments in the permanent technological development (*follow-on-imperative*).<sup>19</sup> These developments of the market structure aren't sufficiently examined for the German and European case yet. For the West German arms industry after World War II a great expansion of the public contracts can be shown, whereas the arms exports stagnated up to the Vietnam War at a low level.

**Rüstungsnachfrage und Rüstungsexporte, 1956-1980**



Sources: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade, Washington, Years 1955ff., US Senate, Media Notice; Wehrtechnik 7/1977, pp. 101-103, 2/1978, pp. 46-50; 1/1981, p. 31; Weißbuch der Bundesregierung 1979, p. 36; Haushaltsentwürfe, versch. Jg.

<sup>18</sup> Zdrawomyslaw/Bontrup: Rüstungsindustrie. The recent discussion in: Clemens Wischermann: Der Property-Rights-Ansatz und die „neue“ Wirtschaftsgeschichte, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 19 (1993), pp. 239-258.

<sup>19</sup> Baldwin: Structure; M. Kaldor: The Weapons Succession Process, in: World Politics 38 (1986), pp. 577-595.

Especially since the late 1970s there has been a significant increase in arms exports as the figure shows. On the other hand an increase in Military Research and Development and a stagnancy at a high level can be seen since the 1960s.

### **Military Research and Development (R&D) Expenditures in the Federal Republic**

Year	Mill. of DM	Percentage of Governmental R&D Expenditures	Percentage of R&D Expenditures in the FRG
1963	546	69,6	10,3
1968	982	36,9	9,4
1973	1.372	24,5	6,7
1978	1.707	17,3	5,7

Source: Bundesminister für Forschung und Technologie, Bundesforschungsbericht VI, Bonn 1979, 137 f, Tabellen 1 und 7; Wehrtechnik 4/1981; G. Bräunling/D.-M. Harmsen, Die Förderungsprinzipien und Instrumente der Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik, Göttingen 1975, Arbeitstabelle 1, p. A 1.

For consumption in general, it has been pointed out that in the 1950s/1960s there was a transition from a sales to a buyers market. Recently Kleinschmidt/Triebel asked in case of the German development if this transition with its implications for the marketing strategies already has taken place in the 1950s/1960s.<sup>20</sup> The question of transition hasn't even been decided yet for the German economic recovery of the arms industry. Researchers of the SIPRI spoke of a transition in the 1980s concerning the international arms industry.<sup>21</sup>

The recovery process of the German arms industry in the post-war era started in the 1950s as the FRG entered into the NATO and began to rebuild its military force.<sup>22</sup> In the Spring of 1955 the first German military forces after WW II were built up and tank-contracts for the Suisse enterprise Hispano Suiza were signed. The reason for these contracts of the German *Bundesministerium der Verteidigung* with an international firm was the lack of technological knowledge and industrial power of the German industry. But soon the recovery of producers like Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei displaced the international competitors. Despite the *Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung* being the main contractor for private arms producers in Germany, there's still a huge amount of investment which goes into marketing and sales activities of the arms industry. Marketing not only for the distribution of weapons but also for advertising for a wider audience seems to be of importance to arms producers like Krupp, Rheinmetall or others. My case studies concentrate on this communication policy rather than on product-, distribution- or contract-policy. The contract-policy seems not to be of such great importance for the producer goods industries marketing.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Christian Kleinschmidt/Florian Triebel: Plädoyer für eine (unternehmens-)historische Marketing-Forschung, in: dito (Ed.): Marketing. Historische Aspekt der Wettbewerbs- und Absatzpolitik, Bochum 2004, pp. 9-13, 11.

<sup>21</sup> There are a few studies on this question. Let's mention Frank Barnaby: Arms Industry – A Sellers' Market, in: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 37,5 (1981), pp. 10-12 and Hummel: Rüstungsexportbeschränkungen, p. 79.

<sup>22</sup> Dieter H. Kollmer: Rüstungsgüterbeschaffung in der Aufbauphase der Bundeswehr. Der Schützenpanzer HS 30 als Fallbeispiel (1953-1961), Stuttgart 2002; Werner Abelshausen: Wirtschaft und Rüstung in den Fünfziger Jahren, München 1997; Abelshausen: Rüstung, Wirtschaft, Rüstungswirtschaft: Wirtschaftliche Aspekte des Kalten Krieges in den fünfziger Jahren, in: Das Nordatlantische Bündnis 1949-1956, München 1993, pp. 89-108; Abelshausen: The Causes and Consequences of the 1956 West German Rearmament Crisis, in: NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe, Oxford 1992, pp. 311-334.

<sup>23</sup> K. Backhaus: Investitionsgütermarketing, München 1982; Dieter J.G. Schneider: Investitionsgüter-Marketing, in: Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon, 12. Ed. Wiesbaden 1988, Vol. 3, pp. 2634-2639; Frederick E. Webster/Yoram Wind: Organizational Buying Behavior, Englewood Cliffs, N.Y. 1972.

## 2. Marketing Strategies

In contrast to the anglo-american research there is a lack of intense research on the history of consumption in Germany. German economic and social historians have similar to their colleagues of the *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* just begun to close the gap to the international research.<sup>24</sup> In a first overview over the German studies Kleinschmidt and Triebel have pointed out: „Es fehlen weiterhin einzelwirtschaftliche Untersuchungen, die auf der Mikroebene die unterschiedlichen Aspekte des Marketing als ein solches integriertes Konzept der Absatzplanung analysieren, die nach unternehmerischen Strategien einer zunehmenden Markt-Orientierung im Übergang von Verkäufer- zu Käufermärkten fragen, die die zunehmende Relevanz der Marketing-Abteilungen im Rahmen der sich wandelnden Unternehmensorganisation sowie die Funktion des Marketing als Schnittstelle zwischen F&E-Aktivitäten und Markterschließung beleuchten bzw. einzelne Gestaltungsfelder und Instrumente des Marketing untersuchen, um nur einige Desiderata zu benennen.“<sup>25</sup>

In my paper it should become obvious, that continuing research on the history of consumption especially in the field of marketing has to differentiate between the consumer goods industry on the one hand and the producer goods industry on the other hand. As economists have pointed out, not only the machinery industry as Wolbring and Köhne-Lindenlaub argued<sup>26</sup>, but also the producer goods industry as a whole have to follow other marketing strategies. For the communication politics – to speak in terms of modern economists – of the producer goods industry the personal sales negotiations play a dominant role, because of the complex and technically ambitious kinds of products. For these kind of negotiations the producer goods firm need to have a specialised form of consumer communication for the expansion of the market. Instruments supporting the sales policy in this regard are: references, sales books, advertising materials like brochures, articles, photographs and films, feasibility studies, and free gifts. But of more importance for the consumer goods marketing are more personal communicative instruments like trainings, factory tours, events, fairs, expositions and special meetings. Advertisements in expert journals and newspapers have a more supporting role for the communication policy in the producer goods industry. An important argument for these other forms of marketing has to be seen in the distribution policy of this sector. Direct forms of distribution policy like negotiations with engineers and top managers are much more relevant than in the consumer goods industry, because of the character of the products. Other important international forms are market entrance strategies like indirect export, joint ventures, production licences, and sales or producing bases or subsidiary companies.<sup>27</sup> Let's start the analysis with the participation of arms producers at fairs and exhibitions.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Ursula Hansen/Matthias Bode, *Marketing & Konsum*, München 1999; Barbara Wolbring, *Krupp und die Öffentlichkeit im 19. Jahrhundert*, München 2000; Susanne Hilger, *Menschen und Märkte. 125 Jahre Henkel KGaA*, Düsseldorf 2001 (mit Wilfried Feldenkirchen).

<sup>25</sup> Kleinschmidt/ Triebel, Plädoyer, p. 11; Roman Rossfeld: *Unternehmensgeschichte als Marketinggeschichte.*, in: Kleinschmidt/ Triebel (Ed.), *Marketing*, pp. 17-39.

<sup>26</sup> Wolbring: *Krupp*, pp. 125ff. Köhne-Lindenlaub: *Krupp und die Eisenbahn*, p. 211: “In der Maschinenbau-industrie dagegen gilt es – je nach Art des Produktes – eine eher begrenzte Zahl von Kunden, beispielsweise im Bereich des Eisenbahnzubehörs Vertreter von Eisenbahngesellschaft und Eisenbahnbehörden, für in der Regel größere Aufträge zu gewinnen.”

<sup>27</sup> Dieter J.G. Schneider, *Investitionsgüter-Marketing*, pp. 2634-2639.

<sup>28</sup> It is rather difficult to differentiate between “fairs” for directs consumers and “exhibitions” for the information of a wider public. Mostly the national and international exposition were used in both directions. Therefore I sometimes use the terms synonymous.

## 2.1. National Fairs

The sales instrument of commercial and industrial fairs was developed in France, so that as well as in the field of advertisement the French government and enterprises can be seen as marketing pioneers. In the historical literature the French National Fair of 1798 is regarded as the first industrial fair in general. This fair, like the following in Germany and other countries at the onset of the industrialisation process, was an important element of French industrial politics, because a national market structure was developed, the principles of a competitive economy were introduced and a closer relationship between producers, merchants, and consumers was installed. This fair and the following in 1801, 1802 and 1806 were very successful in terms of public resonance: over 110 exhibitors came to the first, over 1400 to the fourth national fair. An important argument for the organisers was the national one: the fair should demonstrate the force of the French nation against the enemy Great-Britain. “Nos manufactures sont les arsenaux d’où doivent sortir les armes des plus funestes à la puissance britannique”, as the promoters wrote after the Parisian exhibition which fittingly took place on the « *Champ de Mars* ». The beginning of the exhibition also marks a national idea: it was on September the 17<sup>th</sup>, the date of the founding of the French Republic.<sup>29</sup> Further research has to be done regarding the exhibited products: it is not clear, if the exhibited products were presented in such a nationalistic manner as the aims of the fair proclaimed.

Another success of the French fair system has to be seen in its export function: it was Napoleon I. who introduced the industrial fair system in the German states, first in the *Großherzogtum Berg* in 1811. Other small and more regional fairs followed until the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century. The first Prussian exposition started in 1821, but it failed as did the following two Prussian fairs in 1827 and 1832 in terms of resonance because of the reluctance of the producers. The first successful German industrial fair was the “*Allgemeine Ausstellung deutscher Gewerbeserzeugnisse*” of the German *Zollverein* in 1844 in the Berlin *Zeughaus* with the record of 3040 exhibitors – more than any other fair hitherto. The second one in 1850 failed anew, but the third one 1854 in Munich in a special “Palace of Industry” received more resonance from producers (6588 exhibitors) and consumers. The German fairs were like their predecessors in France at the latest since the founding of the German *Zollverein* in 1834 a presentation of both German modernism and German patriotism, they reflected the paradigm of economic growth and development. Their symbolic function for the evolving publicity was – like other bourgeois parties (f.e. *Kölner Dombaufest*) for the political awareness – to unify the German economic nation and to demonstrate the superiority of the German culture.<sup>30</sup>

Krupp was one of the most important industrialists who soon discover the industrial fairs as an important institution for his enterprise in regard of advertisement for his high-quality and reliable products, image-creation and networking.<sup>31</sup> Wolbring argued that the high-quality, specialised and expensive products demand this solution, if Krupp wanted to expand beyond the limits of personal or written contacts with the buyers. The earned awards and grants of the jury were another important goal in the marketing development of Krupp, because they were a quasi-legal document for the superior quality of the Krupp products.

<sup>29</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 84ff., 122ff., citation p. 86.

<sup>30</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 86-90; Art. Industrieausstellungen, in: Deutsches Staats-Wörterbuch, Vol. 5, p. 314f.; Hettling/Nolte: Bürgerliche Feste als symbolische Politik.

<sup>31</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 84f., 90ff.



**Grants and Prizes on national exhibitions for the Krupp Corporation from 1844-1900<sup>32</sup>**

Jahr	Ort	Art der Ausstellung	Auszeichnung
1844	Berlin	Allgemeine Deutsche Gewerbeausstellung	1 Goldmedaille
1852	Düsseldorf	Provinzial-Gewerbeausstellung für Rheinland und Westfalen	Erster Preis
1854	München	Allgemeine deutsche Industrieausstellung	Große Gedenkmünze, goldene Medaille für Kunst und Industrie
1880	Düsseldorf	Kunst- und Gewerbeausstellung	Keine Teilnahme am Medaillenwettbewerb
1883	Berlin	Hygiene-Ausstellung	1 Goldmedaille

In 1902 it was Friedrich Alfred Krupp and his leading director Jenke, who planned together with Servaes (Duisburg), Lueg (Oberhausen) and the leading men of the *Nordwestliche Gruppe des Vereins deutscher Eisen- und Stahlindustrieller* another huge exposition of manufacture, industry and arts at Düsseldorf.<sup>33</sup> The arguments for this fair were national and economic ones. The exposition was planned as an anti-exposition against the World Exposition in Paris in 1900, because the German heavy industry got not enough exposition space for its products.<sup>34</sup> Krupp exhibited not only his cannons in form of a cannon castle, but also the social achievements of his workers. Krupp personally demonstrated the exhibited products to the Kaiser at the occasion of his visit. Krupp wrote later about this visit: “Es erübrigt sich zu sagen, daß das hier in kunstvollster Anordnung aufgestapelte Kriegs- und Friedens-Material das Interesse seiner Majestät in hohem Maße erregte.”<sup>35</sup>

Although Krupp missed the first national exposition, in 1844 he presented in addition to cast iron bells, a cast iron plate and two guns made of cast iron as well as raw material for another weapon producer, Jaeger from Elberfeld, a former district of Wuppertal. Wolbring thought that Krupp presented the weapon not because of his production range, but because weapons got more attention and public resonance in Prussia than other steel and cast iron products.<sup>36</sup> At the exhibition in Munich in 1854 Krupp was represented with sophisticated weapons, like a 6-pound-cannon, special guns and breast harnesses. Beside the product presentation Krupp developed different forms of advertising materials such as price listings, leaflets and a book with products and short articles about the social activities of the firm. Altogether it was a great success for Krupp, especially the cannon and the railroad articles were mentioned in several newspaper articles.<sup>37</sup> Maybe the high attention of this weapon brought Krupp to the conclusion to present more of these products on international expositions like the first World Exposition in London in 1851 and their later successors.

<sup>32</sup> After Wolbring: Krupp, p. 113.

<sup>33</sup> Karl Bernd Heppe: Die Industrie- und Gewerbe-Ausstellung von Rheinland, Westfalen und benachbarten Bezirken, verbunden mit einer deutsch-nationalen Kunstaussstellung in Düsseldorf 1902, in: Stadtmuseum Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf (Ed.): Aspekte Düsseldorfer Industrie 1831-1981, Düsseldorf 1981, pp. 98-113.

<sup>34</sup> Heppe: Industrie- und Gewerbe-Ausstellung, pp. 99 and 101.

<sup>35</sup> Heppe: Industrie- und Gewerbe-Ausstellung, pp. 109f. Also G. Stoffers (Ed.): Die Industrie- und Gewerbeausstellung für Rheinland, Westfalen und benachbarte Bezirke, verbunden mit einer Deutsch-Nationalen Kunstaussstellung, Düsseldorf 1903.

<sup>36</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 90ff.

<sup>37</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 98ff. and the booklet from Krupp for the exposition at Munich.

## 2.2. International Expositions

### a) World Expositions

The research on the history of the World Expositions with modern cultural methods has shown an enormous increase in the last few years, although international exhibitions have been researched thoroughly in the English and German technical and social history.<sup>38</sup>

According to Christoph Cornelissen a far-reaching interdisciplinary study over the political, economical, social and cultural dependencies in this field is still missing.<sup>39</sup> The role of these exposition, like other fairs for the weapon and arms producing industries has not been carefully researched either. Therefore I begin with a first case study on Krupp.

For the development of the private German arms industry the world expositions were of tremendous importance. In the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century nearly all important manufacturers and producers of arms and arms systems exhibited their products, mostly in prominent places.<sup>40</sup>

Wolbring showed thoroughly in her important study that as well as in the case of the world expositions as later in the field of public relation it was Krupp, who was an early adopter of new means of mass media to expand sales of his products and to transport a sense of the firms well-known status and reputation onto the public sphere.<sup>41</sup> At the first World Exposition in London in 1851, which is researched in depth, Krupp presented both civilian and military products. Friedrich Harkort, one of the first movers and founders of the German heavy industry, wrote after the London World Exposition 1851 over one of Krupps exhibited products, a huge block of cast iron: “Dieses Ding da wird einer der merkwürdigsten Denksteine in der Geschichte der industriellen Entwicklung Deutschlands werden.”<sup>42</sup>

Wolbring thought that it was not only the mere technical achievement, but with the granted Council Medal and the enormous public attention the block changed it's function from an exhibited product to a national monument. It symbolised the successful race of Germany to catch up with the English superior position in the age of industrialisation.<sup>43</sup> Together with an exhibited cannon of enormous range, Krupp tried to transport a specific image of his firm. The exhibition of the cannon was carefully arranged and enacted with military symbols like a *Lafette* and breast harnesses of the Prussian Army. Krupps exhibition had a very strong resonance: All visiting emperors like the Queen and the Portuguese King admired the exhibited products of Krupp. The German as well as the English newspapers like the “Observer”, the “Illustrated London News” and the “Daily News” were full of astonishment and admiration. They wrote over the cannon, that it was “a piece of workmanship he may well be proud of, and shows to what perfection of hardening and density the metal can be brought”

<sup>38</sup> Allwood: *The Great Exhibitions*, 1977; Kroker, Plum and Haltern; Eckhard Fuchs (Ed.): *Weltausstellungen im 19. Jahrhundert*, Leipzig 1999; Martin Wörner: *Vergnügung und Belehrung. Volkskultur auf den Weltausstellungen 1851-1900*, Münster 1999; Kretschmer 1999; Christoph Cornelissen: *Die politische und kulturelle Repräsentation des Deutschen Reiches auf den Weltausstellungen des 19. Jahrhunderts*, in: *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 52 (2001), pp. 148-161. Short version: *Das Deutsche Reich auf den Weltausstellungen des 19. Jahrhunderts*, in: “*Wolkenkuckucksheim*”. *Internationale Zeitschrift für Theorie und Wissenschaft der Architektur* 5 (2000) [[www.theo.tu-cottbus.de/wolke/deu/Themen/themen001.html](http://www.theo.tu-cottbus.de/wolke/deu/Themen/themen001.html)], p. 2.

<sup>39</sup> Cornelissen in *Wolkenkuckucksheim*, p. 2.

<sup>40</sup> Winfried Kretschmer, *Geschichte der Weltausstellungen*, Frankfurt/New York 1999; Evelyn Kroker, *Die Weltausstellungen im 19. Jahrhundert. Industrieller Leistungsnachweis, Konkurrenzverhalten und Kommunikationsfunktion unter Berücksichtigung des Ruhrgebietes zwischen 1851 und 1880*, Göttingen 1975.

<sup>41</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, p. 145.

<sup>42</sup> Louis Berger: *Der alte Harkort. Ein westfälisches Lebens- und Zeitbild*, 5. Ed. Leipzig 1925 [FEd. 1895], p. 397. Cited as in Wolbring: Krupp, p. 10.

<sup>43</sup> Wolbring, Krupp, p. 10.

and “the beauty of the polish was the admiration of [sic!] number of English mechanics”.<sup>44</sup> This was no blind fortune, but the result of a well organised and carefully strategically designed enactment. Wolbring thought that it is rather curious that Krupp used the public only as a communicative vehicle to convince his targeted consumers, the important emperors and highly decorated militaries. Through this vehicle Krupp built up an image of quality, solidity, technical perfectionism, patriotism and modernity in combination with a far reaching understanding of innovation.<sup>45</sup> In contrast to later World Expositions this cannon was not a product which could be bought directly, but it was an exposition artefact and vehicle, used to support the well-known image of Krupp and to contact new consumers. After the exposition Krupp donated it to the Prussian King. An example, he followed at the later third World Exposition in 1867 in Paris with two cannons he donated to the Prussian king and to the Russian Tsar. Further proof for this kind of use of the exhibited products is that most of the Krupp products were not directly ordered, for example the Prussian Army did not order many ordnance guns before 1859.<sup>46</sup>

The successful World Exposition in 1851 became a model for later Krupp appearances on the international scene, like Paris 1855, London 1862 and Paris 1867. After these four expositions the Krupp appearance changed only in a few details. But the image he created each time by presenting the biggest cannon in the world did not change at all. The grants and awards Krupp received gave an impression of the public attention to Krupp.

#### **Grants and Prizes on international exhibitions for the Krupp Corp. from 1851-1900<sup>47</sup>**

Jahr	Ort	Art der Ausstellung	Auszeichnung
1851	London	Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of all Nations	Council Medal
1855	Paris	Weltausstellung	Große Ehrenmedaille in Gold
1862	London	Weltausstellung	2 Bronzemedailen
1867	Paris	Weltausstellung	1 Goldmedaille 1 Silbermedaille
1873	Wien	Weltausstellung	Ehrendiplom als höchste Auszeichnung
1876	Philadelphia	Weltausstellung	2 Bronzemedailen (3 Diplome und 3 Bronzemedailen nach anderer Quelle)
1876	Brüssel	Exposition et Congrès d’Hygiene et de Sauvetage	1 Goldmedaille 1 Bronzemedaille
1878	Paris	Weltausstellung	Nicht teilgenommen
1879	Sydney	Weltausstellung	1 Goldmedaille 1 Bronzemedaille
1880	Melbourne	Weltausstellung für Stahlfabrikate	1 Goldmedaille
1889	Paris	Weltausstellung	Nicht teilgenommen
1893	Chicago	Weltausstellung	20 Diplome, 13 Medaillen
1900	Paris	Weltausstellung	1 Diplom, 3 Bronzemedailen für Wohlfahrtseinrichtungen

<sup>44</sup> Quoted after Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 96f.

<sup>45</sup> Utz Haltern, Die Londoner Weltausstellung von 1851. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der bürgerlich-industriellen Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert, Münster 1971, p. 201. Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 13f., 145.

<sup>46</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 98-110.

<sup>47</sup> After Wolbring: Krupp, p. 113.

The World Exposition of 1893 took place in Chicago. There were several huge buildings in different historical styles, like gothic, roman or Italian renaissance. Nearly all areas of human life were presented, each in its own building: manufacturing, peasantry, machinery, energy, mining, electricity, bureaucracy, transport system, horticulture, battle ships, fishing industry, arts, forestry, sawmill, breeding cattle (and of course there was a large Assembly Hall).<sup>48</sup> In front of the impressive Hall of the Federal Government was an exhibition of all kinds of military forces: army, navy (with a full equipped battle ship), coast guard, and lifeguards. This was another good place for Krupp to exhibit its military products, but this time like in Vienna 1873 and in Düsseldorf 1880 in its own pavilion. Because of the difficult relationship with France and the high costs for the firm Krupp himself decided to reduce his engagement with the world expositions in Paris in 1878 and 1889. It is of importance to see that especially after the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870/71 and at the World Exposition in Vienna in 1873 the dominance of the exhibited weapons at Krupp became evident. Krupp exhibited more than 12 cannons of different calibre. After the *Reichsgründung* in 1871 this process gained further dynamic. Gigantic cannons and artillery guns were presented in Philadelphia and Chicago, the largest being 57,5 tons in weight.<sup>49</sup>

Although there was some criticism of the militaristic presentation from the Jury at Paris, French newspapers and the German Jury member Franz Reuleaux, Krupp went on to present himself with the exhibited products and the sophisticated advertising materials not only as an “Industriefürst”, but also as a “Kanonenkönig”.<sup>50</sup> But other iron and steel producers like the *Bochumer Verein* refused to create an image as patriotic weapon producers, in the *Bochumer* case because of the high costs participating in the expositions.<sup>51</sup> In Paris 1878 it was one of the most important French producers, Schneider-Le Creusot, who presented himself as prepared for defence against the German cannons – with a huge steam hammer for armoured plates.<sup>52</sup> This was a big contrast to the militaristic Krupp exposition a few years before.

The development of Krupp ran in part parallel to the development of World Expositions before World War II as it was judged by Cornelissen: “Die ältere Weltausstellungsrhetorik, die auf die Funktion der völkerverbindenden Feste des Friedens im Sinne einer internationalen Aussöhnung und gegenseitigen Information abgehoben hatte, verschwand zwar bis 1914 nicht vollkommen, gleichwohl spricht aus vielen Texten die Tendenz, die Konstellationen einer friedlich ausgetragenen Wirtschaftskonkurrenz mit einem aggressiven nationalen Gehalt aufzuladen. Der ‘friedliche Wettkampf’ der Nationen wurde derart zu einer zeitgenössisch so genannten – ‚großen Heerschau‘ der deutschen Leistungen hypostasiert. Man sprach nicht erst, aber vor allem in Brüssel 1910 von einem ‚glänzenden Sieg der Deutschen‘, wobei – was auffallend zu nennen ist – gerade von seiten der Modernen, also z. B. den Vertretern des Werkbundes, eine neue Radikalität sowohl in die künstlerischen, als auch in die sprachlichen Ausdrucksformen hineingetragen worden ist.”<sup>53</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Pennsylvania Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft (Ed.): Mit der Pennsylvania Eisenbahn zur Columbian Welt-Ausstellung, Philadelphia 1892, p. 110 and 125ff.

<sup>49</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 107ff.; Kretschmer, Geschichte; Detailed Kroker, Weltausstellungen, pp. 58ff.

<sup>50</sup> Kretschmer, Weltausstellungen; Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 107ff. Another critic of Reuleaux was, that the German products in general seemed to be cheap and nasty. F.e. Andrew Bonnell, „Cheap and nasty“. German goods, socialism, and the 1876 Philadelphia world fair, in: International Review of Social History 2001, S. 207-226.

<sup>51</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 107ff.; Kroker, Weltausstellungen, pp. 59ff.

<sup>52</sup> Kretschmer: Geschichte der Weltausstellungen, pp. 116f.

<sup>53</sup> Cornelissen, Das Deutsche Reich, p. 9f.; Kretschmer, Geschichte der Weltausstellungen, p. 38 and 46f.

And Cornelissen argued that the German representation in general developed in three periods: first, the approach of a national-cultural self-determination, second, a phase of an equilibrium of powers in the international system and third, a hegemonial approach together with hostile arguments against other nations.

In this respect the international expositions are important for the creation and mediation of self- and extraneous-stereotypes, which are still not enough researched. This thesis is still true concerning later expositions, which showed a different kind of national identity. Because after World War II the specialization and development of the fair sector brought about a completely different sort of world exposition. In this frame the last presentation of German weapons and arms systems took place at the world exposition in Brussels in 1958.<sup>54</sup>

### **b) Industrial Fairs or Expositions of special interest**

Other important instruments to develop the market for weapons and arms systems were highly specialised industrial fairs or expositions, which became recent events in the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Not only fairs for direct consumers or retailers, but also expositions with a special theme for consumers, scientists, governmental contractors, lobbyists and a wider audience. These fairs and expositions often have a focus rather on information and communication than on direct sales. Therefore it is difficult to differentiate whether they are fairs or expositions.<sup>55</sup> For the weapon producers there existed since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century a few of those special expositions like the international aerospace fairs in France, Great-Britain or Germany (Internationale Luft- und Raumfahrttausstellung, ILA) or the later fairs for electronic systems like the Eurosatory Rüstungselektronik at Le Bourget (Paris).<sup>56</sup> These specialised fairs were founded later than the mentioned national and international ones and are still of higher importance for the industrial sales in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The first special German exposition for civilian and military airplanes, the ILA, took place in Frankfurt (Main) in 1909. The later expositions developed in content and range, which was of importance for the move of the ILA to the Berlin-Charlottenburg fair-grounds in 1928. From 1955 up to 1990 this special exposition took place every two years in Hannover-Langenhagen. The year 1992 brought a move to Berlin-Schönefeld airfield, from the 6th to 12th June 2000 the ILA took place for the fifth time.<sup>57</sup> Several ILA-fairs were co-organized with the German aerospace association, the *Deutscher Verband für Luft- und Raumfahrt*. It is not clear, in which ways the association influenced design and content of the ILA. Claus H. Boerner from the top association of the German fairs and expositions (*Ausstellungs- und Messe-Ausschuß der Deutschen Wirtschaft e.V., AUMA*) judged concerning the general role of associations and lobby-groups in Germany: „Bei anderen Messen und Fachgesellschaften wiederum treten Wirtschaftsverbände als Mitveranstalter neben den Messegesellschaften auf

<sup>54</sup> Wengenroth: in: Vondran (Ed.), *Stahl und Weltausstellungen* and Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 121f.

<sup>55</sup> Bruno Tietz, Für jeden Besucher das passende Angebot – Aus allgemeinen Messen werden Themenmesse, in: Georg Küffner/Joachim Mortsiefer (Ed.): *Messen als Bestandteil des betrieblichen Marketings*, Frankfurt a.M. 1990, pp. 89-102, see esp. pp. 89ff.

<sup>56</sup> Stefan Gose: ILA 2000: Öffentlichkeit bezahlt zweitklassige Rüstungsmesse, in: *ami* 6/00, S. 21-25, hier: 24.

<sup>57</sup> Stefan Gose: ILA 2000: Öffentlichkeit bezahlt zweitklassige Rüstungsmesse, in: *ami* 6/00, S. 21-25, hier: 21.

oder gewähren aktive Unterstützung als ideale Träger. Daß damit immer eine weitgehende bis gänzliche Bestimmung der Veranstaltungsmodalitäten einhergeht, liegt auf der Hand“.<sup>58</sup>

Not only in this case, but also concerning the role of the German federal and regional governments for the development of this fair further research is needed. It is a fact, that over the years a large amount of public subsidies were spent on this industrial fair.

In 1998 nearly half of the costs were financed with public means (6 Mio. DM). It was the only fair subsidised by the federal government, in 1998 with an amount of 1 million DM. The following expositions in the years 2002 and 2004 showed us a similar image, but the cost for the German Bundesländer Berlin and Brandenburg doubled like the total costs rapidly.<sup>59</sup> The public spending was intended to give the exposition an image of „The Leading European Fair for the Aerospace Industries“<sup>60</sup>, which is reflected by a tremendous amount of contracts (over 10 Billions of DM).

The ILA of 1998 showed us – like the exhibited products – an ambivalent dual-use-character. On the one hand it is a mass event and exposition on the other hand it is an important industrial trade fair for the 825 exhibiting enterprises.<sup>61</sup> The public interest is enormous: at the ILA `98 226.846 visitors were counted, but one must admit that most of them are visitors with a military interest.<sup>62</sup> The event marketing seems to me connected with a special interest. There were air- and airstunt-shows of fighter planes, there were special exhibitions f.e. the historical exhibition “50 Years of Berlin Air Bridge” and a huge space exhibition. Besides this content-connected artefacts there were the usual attendant programs like beer-, sausages- and popcorn-sales. The industrial fair on the other hand is built on three main topics. First, the exhibitions of enterprises (in 1998 300 aeroplanes, nearly 30% for military use), second, conferences for which are mostly non-public or discreet and third, a center for east-west-relations as a special „Markenzeichen der ILA“<sup>63</sup>.

Many questions are left in this field of research and concerning the still neglected historical role of special fairs like the ILA: Why are such fairs of special interest installed and financed by the public hand? Why is a such huge public event for the mass visitors planned and implemented? Which special forms of direct and indirect marketing and communication policy are used? In which way do these fairs represent marketing as far-reaching communicative and social strategy?<sup>64</sup>

### 2.3 Event Marketing

Besides these national, international and special exhibitions and fairs there is one other form of organised personal sales technique: event marketing. I can not expand on this instrument in detail, therefore a brief sketch will have to suffice:

<sup>58</sup> Claus H. Boerner: Aktiv als Veranstalter oder ideeller Träger – Die Rolle der Verbände bei Messen und Ausstellungen, in: Georg Küffner/Joachim Mortsiefer (Ed.): Messen als Bestandteil des betrieblichen Marketings, Frankfurt a.M. 1990, pp. 133-144, here p. 135.

<sup>59</sup> Stefan Gose: in: *ami* 6/00, pp. 21-25; Christopher Steinmetz, ILA: Brandenburger Erdnüsse, in: *ami* 6/02, pp. 3f.; Nina Odenwälder, ILA 1998: Auch eine Rüstungsmesse, in: *ami* 7/98, pp. 23f.; Handelsblatt, 19.5.1998.

<sup>60</sup> Odenwälder: ILA 1998, p. 23.

<sup>61</sup> Odenwälder: ILA 1998, p. 23. See *taz* 19.5.1998.

<sup>62</sup> Gose: ILA 2000, p. 21.

<sup>63</sup> Odenwälder: ILA 1998, p. 23. See Handelsblatt, 19.5.1998 and FAZ 19.5.1998.

<sup>64</sup> See Alexander Schug: *History Marketing*, Bielefeld 2003.

As in the case of the world expositions it was Krupp who was a German pioneer in the field of event marketing. It began with the visits of the Kaiser, the Tsar and other European and Asian emperors and in the end a wider range of events was organised like weapon testings, ship baptisms, and reunions with interested high-rank militaries. These numerous special events were photographed and the memorial albums were given as a free gift to the consumers. For the organisation of these memorials a special department was founded at the Krupp works in Essen, the *Photographische Abteilung*, which became the *Lithographische Anstalt* and the further *Graphische Anstalt*.

This modern form of consumer communication was improved over time and was still used after the World War II as one can see in the following photographs.<sup>65</sup>

The image, which should be conveyed, was the same as at the World Expositions and industrial fairs: Krupp as a modern, innovative and trustful enterprise, Krupp as a socially responsible firm, Krupp as a clean, natural and ecological mill, and the products should represent the superiority of the corporation as well as the power and force. But for Krupp himself it was important that “die beiden [Kanonen] dürfen nicht als im Kampf begriffen dargestellt werden, sondern als zufällig nebeneinander aufgestellt.” That means that war and aggression were neglected on the photographs which was – according to Wolbring – a modern form in the Prussian iconography of arms presentation.<sup>66</sup>

Thus the *Graphische Anstalt* with its special means of advertising was certainly an important instrument for Krupp to create a specific image of his corporation. If it was already a modern form of Corporate Image has to be resolved by further research.

### 3. Transnational Images of the Corporation

#### 3.1. Brands and Logos

The development of modern business strategies reached the point that brands, trademarks and logos serve as shorthand to summarise and understand the nature and history of the economic actors which are thus abbreviated. The different functions and intentions behind the marketing strategies and thus the advertising and communication policy vary from basic sales technique over sophisticated branding to political and transnational cultural manoeuvring which can be demonstrated by two case studies of Krupp and Rheinmetall. These case studies answer the question, which local, regional, national or international symbols, logos or marketing strategies are used?

#### a) Krupp as a first-mover in corporate imagery

As one can see in the case study of the 1811 founded Krupp company the history of marketing and advertisement began late for most of the German Industry. Until 1870 there existed no advertisement department or unit in the German industrial enterprises. Dirk Reinhardt, Fritz Blaich, Jürgen Kocka and others have pointed out that this was the result of a longterm fixation on production rather than on distribution. Entrepreneurs tried to convince consumers or contractors with the quality and price of products. Change came with the *Gründerkrise*.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>65</sup> In detail Wolbring: Krupp; Gall: Der Aufstieg; Gall (Ed.): Krupp; Tenfelde: Bilder von Krupp.

<sup>66</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 126-138, citation p. 134 after FAH 2 M 78.9, fol. 108.

<sup>67</sup> Dirk Reinhardt: Von der Reklame zum Marketing. Geschichte der Wirtschaftswerbung in Deutschland, Berlin 1993, zugl. Diss. Münster 1991, p. 24; Fritz Blaich: Absatzstrategien, 1982, pp 12-30, esp. p. 16. Kocka: 1977, p. 273.

Representatives of the heavy industry followed the example of drugstores and warehouses to win a greater public for their products and make consumers familiar with the high quality and technology standards of production.

One of the first movers was Alfred Krupp, which voiced the former convictions in a letter in the 1860s. In 1862 he wrote, that he despises “alle öffentliche Verhandlung [sic!] hiesiger Angelegenheiten und Interessen” and that he won’t be interviewed by journalists.<sup>68</sup>

As Wolbring showed in her convincing study of the Public Relations at Krupp in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, that was mainly the result of three press quarrels in which Krupp was involved in 1844, 1852 and 1854. The first case took place in connection with the Berliner Gewerbe-Ausstellung of 1844. Krupp was the steel supplier of a decorated Elberfeld weapon manufacturer named Wilhelm Jaeger. Krupp intervened when Jaeger did not mention the Krupp works as the main supplier for his decorated products. According to Wolbring, this case showed in general the ambivalence of Krupps press engagement: “Sehr genau registrierte er die Berichte der Zeitungen und schenkte ihnen viel Aufmerksamkeit, besonders wenn sie etwas Unrichtiges oder seiner Ansicht nach Falsches enthielten. Er war sorgfältig auf seinen guten Ruf bedacht, die Qualität seiner Erzeugnisse sollte über jeden Zweifel erhaben sein. Doch interessierte ihn hierbei eigentlich nur die Ansicht seiner Kunden, in diesem Falle der Berliner Behörden und natürlich die der für die Preisvergabe zuständigen Ausstellungsleitung, die durch solche Artikel beeinflusst werden könnten. Die allgemeine öffentliche Meinung war nur in zweiter Linie interessant.” Following an article in 1852, which was negative for his sales of railroad material to the *Schlesisch-Märkische Bahn* and to the *Ostbahn*, and after an unsuccessful press and jury intervention against the products of his competitor *Bochumer Verein für Bergbau und Gußstahlfabrikation* in 1854 and 1855 Krupp decided to modify his media politics.<sup>69</sup> From 1855 on it was strictly forbidden to visit the mill, even though Krupp himself had visited and used the knowledge of the progressive English iron and steel works.<sup>70</sup> The emphasis of the Krupp media politics was placed on articles designed to inform, impress and influence the consumers of the products rather than the wider public.<sup>71</sup> The press as designer of a public opinion was to be kept out of the firms politics and consumer-relations. This is decisely shown in the argument of Krupp, “daß wir vom Publikum – nur nicht vom Consumenten unbemerkt unseren Weg gehen wollen”.<sup>72</sup> Of greater importance for the consumer relations were the reports in the expert journals “Militär-Wochenblatt“, „Allgemeine Militär-Zeitung“ (edited at Darmstadt), „Zeitschrift des Vereins für das Eisenhüttenwesen“, and „Eisenbahn Zeitung“.<sup>73</sup>

In 1866 Alfred Krupp drastically changed his politics towards the mass media. In November 1866 he decided to introduce the following steps towards an active media policy: “Es sollte veranlaßt werden, daß in angesehenen überregionalen Zeitungen Artikel über das Unternehmen und vor allem über die Kruppsche Kanonenproduktion erschienen. Dem Unternehmen wohlgesonnene Journalisten sollten hierfür mit Material versorgt werden.

<sup>68</sup> Alfred Krupp an Carl Meyer 11.2.1862, HA Krupp WA VII f 1576, fol. 2, quoted as cited in: Reinhardt: Von der Reklame, p. 25.

<sup>69</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 146-155.

<sup>70</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, p. 149. She quoted FAH Krupp 2 M 78.7, p. 174.

<sup>71</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 149, 155, 169.

<sup>72</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, p. 149. She quoted Wilhelm Berdrow (Ed.): Alfred Krupps Briefe, p. 129.

<sup>73</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, p. 155. She quoted WA 3/2, p. 449f.



Wenn sich kein geeigneter Berichterstatter fände, könnten die Artikel auch in der Firma verfaßt werden, so dass man sich nur noch mit einer Redaktion in Verbindung setzen müsse.“<sup>74</sup> The content of the articles was proclaimed by Alfred Krupp himself: “das Alter und die Entwicklung der Fabrik, die Leistungen in der Canonen-Fabrikation seit 1847 – die Ausbildung derselben, die Staaten, welche Alle bisher sich damit ausrüsteten.“<sup>75</sup>

Important arguments for the consumers and against his competitors like *Bochumer Verein* should be underlined, such as quality, accuracy, durability, technical advantages (esp. the fastener).<sup>76</sup> The favoured journals for these articles were the “*Vossische Zeitung*”, “*Unsere Zeit*”, and for the technique and production of canons the “*Darmstädter Militärzeitung*”.<sup>77</sup> Wolbring judged this form of media politics to be a first step towards modern public relations and Corporate Image-creation. Krupp can be seen as pioneer in this field, despite his severe reserve against any kind of “*Reclame*”, which led to several steps backward concerning active marketing forms.<sup>78</sup> F.e. the ideas of Krupp-manager Albert Pieper to show important consumers parts of the mill and to inform in detail about the production procedures were not introduced in 1867, but later.<sup>79</sup> Despite this delay these ideas can be interpreted as first steps toward an open house policy which has been described as marketing-innovation by Hilger, Hundhausen, Kunczik and others for the Federal Republic of Germany after World War II.<sup>80</sup> In contrast to the later marketing strategies of US-enterprises with its far-reaching forms of Public Relations and this kind of open door-policy, here it was exclusively reserved for the consumers and contractors of Krupp.

Another example of Krupp media politics demonstrates a special form of modern public relations which was introduced at the Krupp works before the founding of the German Kaiserreich. In 1870 Krupp derived a plan to hire a writer, a “*Literat*”, especially for the press influence and for public relations.<sup>81</sup> As Wolbring has shown, this writer worked in the field of press evaluation and purposeful press information for Krupp until 1920 for a good salary. In the beginning he was informed and paid by the Berlin representative of Krupp. At least from 1887 on he was assigned directly to one of the leading managers of the Krupp *Direktorium*. This means that the later founded press institutions at the Krupp works were not involved in this special and sometimes clandestine forms of press influence.

<sup>74</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 157f.

<sup>75</sup> Alfred Krupp to his confidential clerk (Prokurist) Alberst Pieper, 27.11.1866, in: FAH Krupp 2 M 78.9, fol. 87. My source for this quotation is: Wolbring: Krupp, p. 158.

<sup>76</sup> Alfred Krupp to his confidential clerk (Prokurist) Alberst Pieper, 27.11.1866, in: FAH Krupp 2 M 78.9, fol. 87ff. My source for this quotation is: Wolbring: Krupp, p. 158.

<sup>77</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, p. 159.

<sup>78</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 158f. and 122f.; Zankl: Public Relations, p. 15; Meffert: Marketing, p. 493; Kunczik: Geschichte der Öffentlichkeitsarbeit in Deutschland. Kunczik argued against the thesis that the begin of PR in Germany is to fix after World War II with the influences of American marketing strategies.

<sup>79</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, p. 157.

<sup>80</sup> Susanne Hilger: „Amerikanisierung“ deutscher Unternehmen. Wettbewerbsstrategien und Unternehmenspolitik bei Henkel, Siemens und Daimler Benz 1945–1975, Stuttgart 2004, pp. 260f. and 266f.; Hundhausen: Amerika, pp. 72f., 80; Schmidt: Public Relations, pp. 12f.; Tänzler: Arbeitsleben, pp. 17f.; Kunczik: Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, p. 189; Avenarius, Horst: Public Relations. Die Grundform der gesellschaftlichen Kommunikation, Darmstadt 1995; Tedlow: Corporate Image; Wünsch: Unternehmerbild, p. 103f.; Merkt, Hanno: Die Geschichte der Unternehmenspublizität in Deutschland, Europa und den USA, in: Beiträge zur Börsen- und Unternehmensgeschichte, Frankfurt/Main 2001, pp. 23-147.

<sup>81</sup> Alfred Krupp to Carl Meyer 11.2.1862, HA Krupp WA VII f 1576, fol. 2f. und HA Krupp FAH II B 57, quoted as cited in: Reinhardt: Von der Reklame, p. 25. See also Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 160-164.

It is possible that this organisational form served as an instrument, to conceal the connections with the press agent Grünstein.<sup>82</sup> Despite this developments in the direction of a modern marketing policy, the organisation structure of the heavy industry enterprises remained the same until the turn of the century. As Dirk Reinhardt showed it seems to be plausible that in 1911 Hanomag in Hannover was the first enterprise of the heavy industry which had a special advertising unit. But since 1890 Krupp already had a special department which is called ‚Nachrichtenbureau‘, news department.<sup>83</sup> In the beginning the development of adverts was less important than the evaluation of the press and the organisation of the visitors tours through the company. But as the unit grew from four to sixteen referents and fourteen workers in 1906 advertisement also became more important.<sup>84</sup> Not until the end of World War I and the following years of Americanisation in the advertisement sector was a real advertisement unit installed at Krupp. Until then there was no understanding of the use of such a department at the Krupp *Direktorium*. Instead Krupp invested in other forms of public relations, especially at expositions and fairs.<sup>85</sup> In the 1920s Krupp turned to a new strategic direction and followed the example of the trademark article industry. In this sector advertisement units were installed earlier, influenced by America especially by creative professionals who had worked in the USA such as Hans Domizlaff and Paul E. Sohm.<sup>86</sup> Krupp built up his advertisement department in 1921, starting after the war with difficulties of sales in civilian markets. The department was headed by Max Rienecker, with three employees assisting him. The unit was part of the superior department of finance and ordnance (*Oberabteilung Finanzen und Verwaltung*).<sup>87</sup> Like Krupp other companies started first with a single professional (the *Preßagent*), who was responsible for feeding the newspapers and the press with positive articles about the firm. Dirk Reinhardt and other contemporary authors judge this special agent as an organisational form of the war economy, because the agent worked like a military press officer.<sup>88</sup>

Despite the conclusions of former studies on the consumer goods industry that the financial needs of newspapers and journals led to the beginning of advertisements, Wolbring and Homburg saw the initial start of adverts founded in the efforts to achieve enough public interest and attention.<sup>89</sup> Krupp is an important example for this thesis, because the advertising and the corresponding units of the firm like the Nachrichtenbureau and the Graphische Anstalt were highly dependent on the development of the relationship between producers, merchants and customers. Wolbring showed in detail how the advertising methods like photographs, films, articles, lists of references, leaflets were further developed to expand on the civilian and military markets for iron and steel products.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 160-164.

<sup>83</sup> Reinhardt: Von der Reklame, p. 25f.; Mitteilungen des Vereins Deutscher Reklamefachleute 16 (1923), p. 256.

<sup>84</sup> HA Krupp Handbuch 1906 und 1914; WA VII f 1576, fol. 5-7; WA IV 1800, Nr. 8, 9, 21; WA IV 1629; WA XI a1 65, quoted as cited in: Reinhardt: Von der Reklame, p. 26.

<sup>85</sup> Reinhardt: Von der Reklame, pp. 29f.

<sup>86</sup> Reinhardt: Von der Reklame, pp. 31-33.

<sup>87</sup> HA Krupp Handbuch 1934; Bekanntmachungen 12 (1921), p. 125; dito 16 (1925), p. 49, 53; WA VII f 1576, fol. 8; WA VII f 1316, quoted as cited in: Reinhardt, Von der Reklame, p. 33.

<sup>88</sup> Mataja (1920), p. 199; Wiehler (1922) und Ehrhart (1923), pp. 9-22. Reinhardt, Von der Reklame, p. 33.

<sup>89</sup> Peter Borscheid: Am Anfang war das Wort; Reinhardt, Von der Reklame zum Marketing; Ingenkamp, Werbung und Gesellschaft, pp. 154ff.; Habermas: Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, p. 248f.; Wolbring: Krupp, p. 125; Homburg: Werbung, in: JWG, pp. 11ff.

<sup>90</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 122ff.

- **The Logo (The Three Rings)**

To focus on one example, it is interesting to see how Krupp developed a trademark for his corporation. Though founded in 1811 in the early 1820s it was still merely the name “*Fried. Krupp*” which should stand as a guarantee for high quality steel and innovative procedures in fabricating steel.

Over a long period of time, the brand for the Krupp steel products remained the firm name.<sup>91</sup> Since 1847 Krupp ignored the possibility of having a registered trademark, but after the introduction of the “Reichsgesetz über Markenschutz” (30. November 1874), the first real trademark law, there were first reflections over a trademark at the Krupp plant. The first concepts were: a shell with two flashes of lightning, a half winged railroad tyre, pictures of a steam hammer and the tower of the big steam hammer „Fritz“, and a stylised sign of three rings. Alfred Krupp himself chose the last concept study – a stylisation of the seamless railroad tyre – one of the most famous inventions from Krupp. The graphic was the most stylised and abstract symbol, which presented a ornament-less, clear and precise aesthetic. It is also a symbol of perfection, merely through the number three which symbolise the divine trinity. The peaky form of a pyramide also reflects a devine element. Although the three ring are not intertwined, they evoke the illusion of close connection and proximity to the observer. This could be – according to Wolbring – an allusion on the idea of the enterprise as a social institution. The logo was registered as a trademark of the Krupp Gußstahlfabrik at the 9<sup>th</sup> of December 1875 at the Königliche Kreisgericht Essen and nearly twenty years later on the 5<sup>th</sup> of April 1895 at the Kaiserliche Patentamt in Berlin. Altogether it was registered in 57 countries all over the world and used as a logo on Krupp products.<sup>92</sup> This was one of the reasons for the popularity and well-known standard of the logo. In later years it became nearly a metonymy for the firm, therefore it was used as a logo on the jubilee gifts for long-term workers of Krupp.<sup>93</sup>

A short episode of another important manufacturer of guns, the Mauser Werke, Oberndorf, illustrates the ambivalent brand finding process. It was the founder of the Mauser-Werke who registered the trademark “*para bellum*”, in contrast to this son Alfons Mauser, who founded in 1896 an own enterprise for civilian products and registered the trademark “*para pacem*”.<sup>94</sup>

## **b) Rheinmetall as follower in corporate imagery**

The important weapon manufacturer Rheinmetall (Rheinische Metallwaaren- und Maschinenfabrik Akt.-Ges.) was founded in 1889 by the ingenious engineer Heinrich Ehrhardt. He built his plant at Düsseldorf near the large capitals of the iron- and steel-industry. This city with its specialisation in trade, administration and finance has become famous as the “Schreibtisch der Ruhr”.

<sup>91</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, p. 144. Wolbring has exploited carefully material at the Historical Archive of Krupp: WA 4/743: Die Kruppsche Firmenbezeichnung und das Kruppsche Waarenzeichen 1808-1903. But she has not found any personal sources of Alfred Krupp concerning the logo.

<sup>92</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, p. 144f. A good source concerning the history of trademark-protection and the German legal actions is Elmar Wadle: Fabrikzeichenschutz und Markenrecht. Geschichte und Gestalt des deutschen Markenschutzes im 19. Jahrhundert, 2 Bde., Berlin 1977 and 1983, esp. pp. 241ff.

<sup>93</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, p. 145. An example for the metonymous use is Gert von Klass, Die drei Ringe. Lebensgeschichte eines Industrieunternehmens, Tübingen 1953

<sup>94</sup> Alfons Mauser, Eine Werksgeschichte. Fünfzig Jahre Mauser K.-G. Köln, 1896-1946, Köln 1949, pp. 10f. See Max Ebell, Wilhelm Mauser – ein deutscher Erfinder.

But from the very beginning of his firm Erhardt used the short distances to the heavy industry to produce ammunition for the German infantry. Two years later Ehrhardt developed a famous procedure innovation, the “*Press- und Ziehverfahren*”. With this innovation it was possible to produce seamless pipes, tubes and ammunition which became the fundament of the companies production. In 1892 this procedure innovation was used for adverts – and with this innovation a still intact logo and trademark for Rheinmetall was created. It symbolises a metallic square block in a round press form. A rhombus symbolises the cross-section of the steel block, the ring form the cylindrical matrix. But contrary to Krupps cannons the logo of Rheinmetall never became a national symbol or monument.

With the new procedure innovation it was possible to create the first barrel recoil cannon fit for field service in 1898. It was tested and presented in a natural surrounding. Even after the merger of Rheinmetall and Borsig into Rheinmetall-Borsig AG in 1936 the firm still remained an important centre of the German weapon production. The logo of Rheinmetall as well as the products, was well-known in the military sector. Because of the close relationship to the Nazi Government and the military strategies of the Nazi System at the end of World War II a production ban was imposed by the military government. Therefore the Start-up in Düsseldorf after the War began with non-military products in 1950, which were of limited success.

In 1956 a new post-war era began for the firm: the Röchling Group acquired the majority stake in Rheinmetall-Borsig AG (then Rheinmetall Berlin AG), and sold the Borsig AG to the Salzgitter AG. An important step in renewing the plant was the resumption of defence equipment production at Rheinmetall Düsseldorf in the same year. The first product, was the MG 42. Despite beginning of diversification into mechanical engineering and electronics in 1958, the firm re-acquired its core capabilities in its initial field of production in 1964: the production of cannon tube and mount manufacture

Another important step to become a main weapon contractor of the German Bundeswehr was the delivery of the first Leopard 2 battle tank along with the 120-mm smooth-bore cannon and the matching ammunition in 1979. Rheinmetall is proud of this most important “technological innovation from Rheinmetall”. The Leopard tank became famous for its high quality to the public and to armies all over the world. It’s a transnational synonym for the good and high-technology equipment of the German Bundeswehr. The name “Leopard” combines the capabilities of the strong, smart and quick animal with the performance of the German army.

In times of the policy of détente it was Rheinmetall which in the late 1970s already began with a thorough restructuring of non-military sectors. In 1989 after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the East-West-confrontation the corporate strategy was redefined along with deeper diversification into non-military industrial products.

In the 1990s Rheinmetall changed its logo into a new modernised form. It shows the stylised letter “r” in white and blue colours. There are still open questions on the change of the logo, but the new one leaves more possibilities in variations of interpretation. It stands for a “financially strong, internationally successful player in the markets for automotive components and defence equipment”, a more diversified enterprise than before its restructuration after World War II. Although the logo shows a more open, variable image of Rheinmetall, it is possible to interpret it as a gun barrel or as a tank artillery.

This reflects the high importance of the Defence sector with its divisions Land Systems, Weapon & Ammunition, Air Defence Systems, and Defence Electronics for Rheinmetall.

The firm sees itself as “Europe's leading supplier and foremost specialist in the market for land forces equipment”. The production range from “*lightweight, airportable tracked and wheeled armoured vehicles through to medium- and heavyweight systems intended for a diverse range of mechanised mission*”, “*a wide variety of combat support vehicles, including bridge-laying tanks, armoured recovery vehicles and mine-clearing systems as well as robotic*”, “*short-range cannon- and missile-supported anti-aircraft systems*” and “*an extensive array of large- and medium-calibre weapons and ammunition*”.<sup>95</sup>

In 2000 under Klaus Eberhardt as new CEO the strategic direction was changed to reflect a stronger concentration on the core capabilities in the sectors of Defence, Automotive, and Electronics. To have a little outlook at the present advertising campaigns for the mentioned products it is interesting to see that Rheinmetall changed its appearance in the journals of arms technique, but also in the German and international high quality press.<sup>96</sup> As with the “Leopard” after World War II nowadays most of the produced weapons or arms systems are given natural names which become a quality brand in the weapon market. For the Land Systems there are animal names and brands like “Büffel” (recovery tank), “Fuchs” (tracker tank) and “Wiesel” (light armoured vehicle), for the Navy Systems there are no such brands but the advert shows a “White Shark” with the Slogan “It’s good to have a reliable navy!”.<sup>97</sup> All new adverts use analogies and images of animals for the weapon systems instead of technological details or direct arguments of quality and competence. The analogies in the new non-conformistic advertising campaigns are not composed by a highly specialised advertising agency, but by two young trainees at the advertising office of STN Atlas Elektronik GmbH in Bremen, which belongs to the Rheinmetall-DeTec-Gruppe. More than thirteen different adverts are yet presented and planned, which shows the astonishing relevance of this new advertising campaign.<sup>98</sup>

Concerning the creation of a Corporate Image it is interesting to observe that since the aftermath of World War II with brands like the “Leopard” the nature theme remains important for arms producers like Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei. Nowadays the marketing strategies reach beyond this sophisticated branding with the above mentioned adverts in technical and newspaper journals. They still use natural topics of the animal world, but in addition to the older branding form they use special analogies for adverts. The analogies are easily to understand and have – like the brands – a transnational or global character.

In linguistic terms – if we understand texts “as a form of social practice”<sup>99</sup> - one can speak of camouflage and a special form of “framing”, because all products are presented in a natural “frame”.<sup>100</sup>

<sup>95</sup> Rheinmetall-website 20.7.2005.

<sup>96</sup> Rheinmetall AG spend in 2002 22 Mio. E, in 2003 19 Mio. and in 2004 12 Mio. for advertising means. Legal and Consulting costs sunk also in the last years: 51 Mio. in 2002, 43 Mio. in 2003 and 30 Mio. in 2004. Besides this there were provisions and other sales costs paid: 129 Mio. in 2002, 105 Mio. in 2003 and 88 Mio. in 2004. See Rheinmetall AG Geschäftsbericht 2003 and 2004, Konzernanhang Erläuterungen zur Konzern-Gewinn- und Verlustrechnung, Sonstige betriebliche Aufwendungen.

<sup>97</sup> Das Profil: Die Zeitung des Rheinmetall-Konzerns 1/2002, p. 1.

<sup>98</sup> Sebastian Reimann: Der „Weiße Hai“ als Werbestar, in: Das Profil, Die Zeitung des Rheinmetall-Konzerns 1/2002, p. 9. Advert „Der Weiße Hai“, p. 16.

<sup>99</sup> Teun van Dijk (Ed.): Discourse as Social Interaction, London 1997; Andreas Reckwitz: Grundelemente einer Theorie sozialer Praktiken, in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 32,4 (2003), pp. 282-301. See also Una Dirks, The de-/construction of war in the international opinion-leading press: The case of Iraq, in: José M. Bernardo/Guillermo López/Pelegri Sancho (Eds.): Critical Discourse Analysis of the Mass Media, Valencia 2005 (forthcoming).

I'm not sure if one can already speak of conceptual metaphors, possibly in the case of the "Leopard".<sup>101</sup> Certainly all mentioned animals are well-known not only in Germany but also in many other countries, so one can speak of a transnational metaphor in the case of the "Leopard". And it even seems to be clear that within the natural frame it is possible for the observers of the campaign all around the world to create a sense of the weapon systems for himself or herself (the weapon systems as "defender of security", as "smart and quick animals", as "reliable friends"). Thus the complexity and high-technology character of modern weapon systems is reduced to schemes of peoples everyday life, which leads to a transcultural acceptance and a sort of "domestication".<sup>102</sup>

Altogether I think it is yet to soon to come to a final conclusion about the different cultural perspectives and visual cultures, which are inherent of the presented marketing or advertising strategies. Further research on other European weapon producers is urgently needed. Maybe the sociological and linguistic theories on questions like memory, framing and discourses can bring more (theoretical and methodological) light into the recent discussion.<sup>103</sup>

### 3.2. Symbols/National Symbols

This would be very useful for further research on the creation of weapons and weapon systems as symbols or national symbols. As Reinhardt has pointed out in his detailed study of the history of advertising in Germany from the beginning until World War II, nationalistic arguments or stereotypes have been used nearly from the beginning of advertising in Germany. There certainly is a development in nationalistic crises to see, but the national card was played continuously over time and industrial sectors/branches.<sup>104</sup>

In the case of arms producers it still has not been researched in which way the famous products of firms like Krupp, Rheinmetall or Schneider-Le Creusot became symbols of national interest. For Rheinmetall it is surely the "Leopard"-tank which is internationally known as a German superior high-technology weapon. In military circles it is a symbol for the military and economical recovery of Germany after World War II. Like military airplanes such as the "Jäger" and the "Phantom", the "Leopard" developed in a specific form to national symbols. To clear up the role of the expositions and the mass media further research has to be done in the difficult field of public reception.

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<sup>100</sup> The broader frame concept defined by Goffman and Minsky comprises not only structures of perception and lexical semantics, but also pragmatic contexts of experience. After Dirks "The cognitive and pragmatic features of a frame represent prototypical information, for example about its constitutive parts and functions, about its agents and sequences of action, i.e. its scripts. Whatever features are reified [sic!], they are related to each other through a complex hierarchical order." Dirks (2005), p. 21. See also Erving Goffman: *Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of Experience*, New York 1974 and Marvin Minsky: *A framework for representing knowledge*, in: Dieter Metzger (Ed.): *Frame conceptions and text understanding*, Berlin 1980, pp. 1-25.

<sup>101</sup> After Lakoff and Chilton/Schäffner metaphors apply one well-known field of knowledge with another. See Paul Chilton/Christina Schäffner: *Discourse and Politics*, in: van Dijk (1997), pp. 206-230, p. 222; George Lakoff/Mark Johnson: *Metaphors we live by*, Chicago 1980; Lakoff: *The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor*, in: Andrew Ortony (Ed.): *Metaphor and Thought*,<sup>2</sup> Cambridge 1993, pp. 202-251.

<sup>102</sup> Dirks (2005).

<sup>103</sup> David A. Snow/Robert D. Benford: *Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization*, in: Bert Klendermans/Hanspeter Kriesi/Sidney Tarrow (Eds.): *From Structure to Action. International Social Movement Research*, Vol. 1, London 1988, pp. 197-217; Robert Wuthnow: *Communities of Discourse. Ideology and Social Structure in the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and European Socialism*, Cambridge 1989; Wuthnow (Ed.): *Vocabularies of Public Life. Empirical Essays in Symbolic Structure*, London 1992.

<sup>104</sup> Reinhardt: *Werbung*.

This is true for many well-known products of Krupp too. There are several stereotypes which transcend the German national character into the sphere of the Krupp products like “Hart wie Kruppstahl”. Important products like the cannons “Tausendpfünder” and “Dicke Bertha”<sup>105</sup> or the artillery “Siegfriedgeschütz”, “42cm-Mörser” and “Parisgeschütz” also became symbols for the German nation as a whole. On the one hand, these products showed the hegemonial and expansive approach of the German Kaiserreich. On the other hand they reflected the modern, technological innovative and patriotic image of Krupp.

The case of the “Napoleon”-affair, in which Krupp was mainly involved, clearly shows us the relevance of the patriotic argument for the enterprise. An important conservative journal accused Krupp in 1873 to have armed France as the main enemy in the finished war and to have used a inappropriate servile sound in an advertising letter to Napoleon III. The conservative press and the public opinion vote this entrepreneurial marketing strategy to sell his cannons as a lack of patriotic engagement with German goals. According to Wolbring, this also reflects a point of a more general nature: “Der Unternehmer, zumal der Waffenfabrikant, war im Begriff, aus der rein wirtschaftlichen, noch immer als ‘privat’ empfundenen Sphäre auf die politische Bühne und in das Scheinwerferlicht der Öffentlichkeit zu treten.”<sup>106</sup> And in this public sphere symbolic arguments for products were sometimes of more value than the quality and price argument – but many questions in this field have to be left for later research.

#### 4. Conclusion

Finally, the question how the corporations and enterprises presented here created a transnational or global image and thus a global market for their products, remains partly open. Recent economic research in the field of corporate identity has shown the differentiating and thus competitive advantages of a Corporate Image-policy of modern enterprises. According to Feicht and others Corporate Identity is important to create and implement an image of quality and trust. In some sectors it is even possible that products or services can be experienced by the customer over the transmitted image.<sup>107</sup> For modern enterprises it is important to create a coherent image and corporate design of their products and their corporation. Nowadays *Identity Communication* plays an important role in this field.<sup>108</sup>

The case studies of Krupp, Rheinmetall and the ILA demonstrated different aspects of the Corporate Image-theme. In many regards Krupp was a pioneer in the field of strategic image-creation. Public relations, advertising, expositions, fairs, influence on the mass media and other instruments were developed and adopted by Krupp very early. With these instruments an ambivalent and differentiated image has been built up.

<sup>105</sup> WaffenHQ.de. The „Dicke Berta“ cost nearly 1 Mio. M for 2.000 shots. Each shot cost 1.500 M (1.000 M for ammunition).

<sup>106</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, pp. 164-169. Citation p. 167.

<sup>107</sup> Thomas Feicht/Markus Gutberlet: IC oder CI. Identity Communication oder Corporate Identity, in: Ulrike Röttger (Ed.): PR-Kampagnen. Über die Inszenierung von Öffentlichkeit. Opladen 1997, pp. 223-229, esp. 224f. Klaus Birkigt/Marinus M. Stadler: Corporate Identity als unternehmerische Aufgabe, in: Klaus Birkigt (Ed.): Corporate Identity. Grundlagen, Funktionen, Fallbeispiele, Landbergs/Lech 1994, pp. 15ff.; Ingrid Keller: Das CI-Dilemma. Abschied von falschen Illusionen, Wiesbaden 1993; Ralf Kreutzer/Stefan Jugel/Klaus-Peter Wiedmann: Unternehmensphilosophie und Corporate Identity. Empirische Bestandsaufnahme und Leitfaden zur Implementierung einer Corporate Identity-Strategie, Mannheim 1989; Studie I, Corporate Identity in einem multikulturellen Markt. CI in Europa. Paneuropäische Studie 1995/96, München 1996.

<sup>108</sup> Feicht/Gutberlet: IC, p. 229; Hans Raffee/Klaus-Peter Wiedmann (Ed.): Strategisches Marketing, Stuttgart 1989, pp. 662ff.

On the one hand the image refers to basic economic values like quality, solidity, technical perfectionism, innovative power, and modernity. On the other hand it stresses more political or social values of the time like patriotism, nationalism, hegemony, superiority, struggle for (both economical and political) power, force, militarism, trust, order, social cohesion, responsibility for workers and clients, and virility.

As Wolbring has carefully shown over a long period the patriotic argument remained an important argument for the national weapons market, for the consumers of Krupp and for the German public. Under the Krupp-son Friedrich Alfred Krupp rumours started, that the enterprise is not loyal and patriotic enough, due to the increasing exports of weapons. That was the cause for Wolbring to say that the „von Alfred Krupp etablierte Image des Unternehmens als wesentlicher Träger nationalen Aufstiegs, wirtschaftlicher Modernisierung und als Wahrer des sozialen Status quo wurde zunehmend brüchig.“<sup>109</sup> If this thesis applies to Rheinmetall as well, has to be researched later. Despite many neglected aspects of the Rheinmetall advertising history it became clear, that Rheinmetall like other producer of weapons created a special image of its products too. In the Rheinmetall-case my thesis of framing underlines the research on the cultural field of discourses. Rheinmetall used and still uses natural and domestic frames to transport an attractive and familiar image of the produced weapons and weapon systems. The often used transnational understandable animal-theme creates an image of security, trust and well-being, although the produced goods are of a completely different, technological character. Similar uses of advertising and marketing strategies is made with the ILA as a public event, which transports very similar technological images of the basically different markets of civilian and military aerospace.

Like other papers at the EBHA-Conference with a focus on fairs and expositions as well as on corporate images might demonstrate, there's much work left to be done in the field of marketing history. Maybe with different approaches we can fill the gaps of research. I intend to underline the great variety of possible uses of marketing and advertising for the success of international trade, which involves a cross-cultural translation. Areas such as the distribution of products, the advertising of goods from basic items of consumption to high technology items or intangible goods such as corporate images are all important aspects of a broadly based history of international marketing. Further research and discussions are necessary about the question how weapons are sold as high-technology goods and how the marketing strategies especially in the visually shaped field of communication policy and corporate imagery should be analysed.

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<sup>109</sup> Wolbring: Krupp, p. 14.